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A Problem to the Profession and the
Public___________________________
By Charles E. Jordan and James G. Johnston
An auditor examines a set of finan­
cial statements in order to form an 
opinion on those financial state­
ments and expresses this opinion in 
an audit report. The primary bene­
ficiaries of an audit report are third- 
party financial statement users. Un­
less auditors are independent of their 
clients and their clients’ financial 
statements, however, audit reports 
will be of little use. This article pro­
vides an examination of some of the 
problems currently facing auditors 
and their independence.
The auditing profession’s stan­
dards recognize two types of inde­
pendence that must be maintained. 
The first type is known as indepen­
dence in fact and relates to auditors’ 
intellectual honesty. Independence 
in fact means that auditors approach 
all matters concerning an audit exam­
Characters in the scenario are (from left to right): the judge (you, the 
reader); C. P. Akins, managing partner in the defendant CPA firm; I. M. 
Slick, attorney for the defense; one of the plaintiffs (an unidentified 
creditor of Client Co.); Fred D. Fastalk, attorney for the plaintiffs.
ination with complete objectivity. It 
also means that auditors must not 
subordinate their judgment to oth­
ers.
The second type of independence 
identified by professional standards 
is known as independence in appear­
ance. Since auditors’ opinions are 
relied upon by third-party financial 
statement users, auditors must be 
perceived as being independent. Au­
ditors must avoid situations that 
might lead others to believe that 
objectivity has been impaired. But 
maintaining an appearance of inde­
pendence is almost an impossible 
task.
On Trial: Independence 
in Appearance
Imagine that a CPA firm in on trial 
for losing its appearance of inde­
pendence. Fortunately, CPA firms 
never find themselves being sued 
simply because they do not appear 
independent, but this is a good way 
of exemplifying the problems that 
plague a firm’s independence in ap­
pearance. The defendant in our 
make-believe trial is Smith, Jones & 
Co. (SJ), a highly reputable CPA 
firm. The plaintiffs are the stock­
holders and creditors of Client Co., 
one of SJ’s audit clients. The plain­
tiffs are suing SJ because they feel 
that the defendant is no longer capa­
ble of making objective decisions 
concerning the examination of Cli­
ent Co.’s financial statements. As­
sume the scenario includes the char­
acters identified in the illustration 
on this page.
With an air of confidence, the 
defense attorney calls only one wit­
ness, C. P. Akins. The questioning of 
this witness proceeds as follows:
I. M. Slick: “Mr. Akins, would you 
please state your firm’s relation­
ship with Client Co.”
C. P. Akins: “We are Client Co.’s 
external auditor. We examine their 
financial statements and provide 
an audit opinion concerning the 
fair presentation of those finan­
cial statements in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP).”
Slick: “Does your CPA firm set forth 
this GAAP?”
Akins: “No, GAAP is promulgated 
by the Financial Accounting Stan­
dards Board (FASB). As an audit­
ing firm, we simply provide rea­
sonable assurance that Client Co. 
has not materially deviated from 
GAAP.”
Slick: “Have you ever had any dis­
agreements with the management 
of Client Co. concerning the prop­
er application of GAAP?”
Akins: “Oh, yes. Disagreements are 
not uncommon, but we (SJ) never 
subordinate our judgment to that 
of the client. We have our profes­
sional reputation and integrity to 
think of, you know.”
Slick: “As far as your audit of Client 
Co. is concerned, to whom is your 
ultimate responsibility owed?”
Akins: “As with any audit engage­
ment, our ultimate responsibility 
is owed to the financial statement 
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users, Client Co.’s investors and 
creditors. Without these third- 
party users, there would be no 
need for an audit engagement.”
Slick: “Do you or any of the other 
partners and employees of your 
firm own stock or other types of 
financial investments in Client 
Co.?”
Akins: “No. The auditing profes­
sion’s code of ethics does not 
allow us to own financial interests 
in the firms we audit. Furthermore, 
none of our employees who work 
on the Client Co. engagement 
have close relatives holding influen­
tial positions within Client Co.”
Slick: “Do any of your employees or 
fellow partners of SJ make man- 
agerial-type decisions for Client 
Co.?”
Akins: “No, we do not engage in the 
management activities of Client 
Co. If we notice inefficiencies in 
Client Co.’s accounting system, 
we do provide recommendations 
and advice for improvement, but 
the decision to implement the im­
provements rests with Client Co.’s 
own management.”
Slick: “I have only one more ques­
tion for you, Mr. Akins. Before 
now, has your firm ever been sued 
for lack of independence?”
Akins: “No. As a matter of fact, we 
have never been sued for any­
thing, until now. As with most 
CPA firms, our most prized pos­
session is our integrity. This integ­
rity keeps us honest and inde­
pendent in all our dealings with 
Client Co.”
Slick: “Before turning Mr. Akins over 
to Mr. Fastalk for cross-examina­
tion, I would like to make a few 
summary remarks to the jury. Mr. 
Akins contends that his firm does 
not owe its ultimate responsibility 
to Client Co. Furthermore, no one 
associated with SJ owns a finan­
cial interest in or makes manager­
ial decisions for Client Co. All 
employees and partners associat­
ed with SJ are professionals and 
are above reproach. There is no 
reason to doubt SJ’s indepen­
dence with respect to its examina­
tion of Client Co.’s financial state­
ments.”
With C. P. Akins still under oath, it 
is time for the prosecuting attorney, 
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Fred D. Fastalk, to cross-examine 
the witness.
Fastalk: “Before questioning the wit­
ness, I would like to remind the 
jury that SJ’s independence, in 
fact, is not on trial here. We are 
concerned only with its appear­
ance of independence. The issues 
I raise will be directed toward 
proving that SJ does not appear 
independent to an investor or cred­
itor.”
Fastalk: [Addressing C. P. Akins] 
“You stated earlier that your firm’s 
ultimate responsibility is to third- 
party financial statement users. 
Did these third-party users hire 
you to perform the audit of Client 
Co.?”
Akins: “No, we were hired by Client 
Co.”
Fastalk: “I see, and who pays your 
fees when you examine Client 
Co.’s financial statements?”
Akins: “Client Co. pays our fees.”
Fastalk: “In terms of total fees gen­
erated, is Client Co. an important 
client of SJ?”
Akins: “Well, yes. Client Co. is our 
firm’s second largest audit client.”
Fastalk: “Approximately what per­
centage of your firm’s total fees 
earned each year are attributable 
to the services performed for Cli­
ent Co.?”
Akins: “That is difficult to say for 
sure, but the revenue generated 
by the Client Co. engagement is 
probably around 5 percent of our 
total revenue.”
Fastalk: “Can Client Co. terminate 
the engagement and seek the ser­
vices of another CPA firm if it so 
desires?”
Akins: “Yes, of course it can.”
Fastalk: “Mr. Akins, your firm’s rela­
tionship with Client Co. seems to 
create an ironic situation. How 
can you expect an investor or 
creditor to believe that you are 
independent and objective with 
respect to Client Co. when your 
firm’s very livelihood depends up­
on the fees paid by Client Co. and 
others like it?”
Akins: “Well, as I stated earlier, we 
are professionals. Our integrity 
keeps us independent. Outsiders 
must have faith in our integrity.”
Fastalk: “Does your firm perform 
services for Client Co. other than 
your annual examination of their 
financial statements?”
Akins: “Yes, we also provide tax 
services and management consult­
ing services for Client Co.”
Fastalk: “In providing tax services, 
just exactly what does your firm 
do for Client Co.?”
Akins: “We do, of course, prepare 
Client Co.’s tax return. In so doing, 
our primary responsibility is the 
legal minimization of Client Co.’s 
income taxes. We also represent 
Client Co. in tax audits and other 
proceedings conducted by the 
IRS.”
Fastalk: “This is quite interesting. 
Your firm is a strict advocate of 
Client Co. when providing tax 
services, but when you audit Cli­
ent Co.’s financial statements, you 
are completely independent and 
objective. Is this a correct state­
ment?”
Akins: “Yes, that is correct.”
Fastalk: “Mr. Akins, could you give 
us an example of the type of man­
agement consulting services your 
firm provides for Client Co.?”
Akins: “Yes, that will be easy. We at 
SJ pride ourselves on being a 
multi-talented CPA firm. We have 
provided consulting services to 
Client Co. on numerous occa­
sions. For example, three years 
ago Client Co. decided to switch 
from a manual periodic inventory 
system to a computerized perpetu­
al inventory system. SJ was en­
gaged as a consultant for this 
transition. We studied the situa­
tion and recommended the com­
puter hardware and software and 
accounting controls we felt would 
be best for Client Co.”
Fastalk: “Mr. Akins, I am confused 
again. When you audit Client Co.’s 
financial statements, does this in­
clude an examination of Client 
Co.’s inventory system?”
Akins: “Yes, we do examine their 
inventory system. Inventory 
makes up a major portion of Client 
Co.’s total assets.”
Fastalk: “How is it that your firm can 
be independent and objective 
when you are evaluating a system 
that was implemented based upon 
your firm’s recommendation? This 
seems like a direct conflict of 
interest. It appears as though you 
are auditing your own firm’s 
work.”
Akins: “No, we are not auditing our 
own work. When we recommend­
ed the inventory system, we were 
working strictly in an advisory 
capacity. It was Client Co.’s man­
agement who actually decided to 
implement the inventory system. 
When auditing the inventory sys­
tem, we are trying to determine if 
Client Co. is using the system 
properly. Thus, we are perform­
ing two completely different roles 
for Client Co.”
Fastalk: “Thank you, Mr. Akins. I 
have no further questions. I would 
now like to make my closing re­
marks to the jury. Ladies and gen­
tlemen of the jury, the task before 
you is to decide if sufficient evi­
dence has been presented to indi­
cate that Mr. Akins’ CPA firm’s 
independence in appearance has 
been impaired.
“The fee relationship that exists 
between Client Co. and its CPA 
firm seems to negate the latter’s 
appearance of independence. The 
non audit services provided by 
the CPA firm also tend to impair 
the firm’s independence. Any pru­
dent investor or creditor must ques­
tion a CPA firm’s ability to be 
independent in one instance and 
a strict advocate in another.
“Mr. Akins’ firm may be indepen­
dent in fact, but this is not the 
issue here. The issue before us is 
whether his firm appears indepen­
dent. I believe the evidence shown 
here today proves that this CPA 
firm’s appearance of indepen­
dence has indeed been impaired.
A jury of reasonable investors and 
creditors could, very easily, find that 
Smith, Jones & Co. is not indepen­
dent in appearance. Even though 
the participants in this make-believe 
trial do not exist, the issues are real. 
Because of the nature of the CPA/ 
client relationships, CPA firms sim­
ply do not always appear indepen­
dent. Note, however, that these inde­
pendence-damaging relationships 
are not new. On the one hand, socie­
ty has tolerated these relationships 
over the years because the ensuing 
benefits are considered “necessary 
evils.” On the other hand, society 
frowns upon the auditing profes­
sion’s apparent inability to maintain 
its independence in fact.
Independence in Fact
Independence in fact means that 
an auditor’s decisions should be 
made objectively, free and clear of 
any influence that other parties or 
factors might bring to bear. Since 
independence in fact deals with intel­
lectual honesty, its existence is dif­
ficult to prove or disprove. Yet, cur­
rently there are certain conditions 
that would seem to create a gray 




recognize two types of 
independence that must 
be maintained.
For example, competition among 
CPA firms has increased dramati­
cally in the last few years. Increased 
competition is the result of, primar­
ily, the sanctioning of competitive 
bidding by the AICPA, a decrease in 
profits due to skyrocketing malprac­
tice insurance rates, and a shrinking 
pool of clients due to numerous 
corporate mergers. The current com­
petitive environment is exemplified 
in a statement made by J. Michael 
Cook, chairman of Deloitte, Haskins, 
& Sells, the nation’s seventh largest 
accounting firm. Cook states: “Five 
years ago, if a client of another firm 
came to me and complained about 
the service, I’d immediately warn the 
other firm’s chief executive. Today, I 
try to take away his client” [Berton, 
1985a].
Competition increases the likeli­
hood that an auditor will be replaced 
by one who is more likely to comply 
with the client’s wishes. Knowing 
that they can be replaced with rela­
tive ease, auditors may approach 
controversial issues with impaired 
objectivity. Because of this in­
creased competition, clients now 
have more power over their audi­
tors.
This increased competition is forc­
ing auditors to hold down their audit 
fees. To hold down audit fees, audit 
engagements are being completed 
more quickly, and substandard audit 
work may be occurring. As a result 
of the need to complete audits more 
quickly, auditors currently face in­
tense time-budget pressures. To 
meet the stringent time budgets, 
auditors resort to various practices. 
Ibrahim [1986] notes that one such 
practice involves signing off on audit 
program steps without ever com­
pleting the steps. Obviously, such a 
procedure results in the reduction of 
audit quality. The frequency of such 
behavior is impossible to determine, 
but a study by Kelly and Seiler [1982] 
showed that over 30 percent of the 
staff auditors responding to their 
survey had performed in such a 
manner.
Another problem plaguing audi­
tor independence results from audi­
tors performing successive audits. 
There are benefits derived from long 
auditor/client relationships; for one, 
auditors do not have to relearn the 
client’s accounting system each 
year. Thus, auditscan be performed 
more efficiently, benefiting both the 
auditors and their clients. However, 
long auditor/client relationships may 
result in auditor complacency. This 
problem was summed up in a 1979 
Senate Subcommittee report on the 
accounting establishment. The re­
port stated:
Long association between a corpora­
tion and an accounting firm may 
lead to such a close identification of 
the accounting firm with the inter­
ests of its client’s management that 
truly independent action by the ac­
counting firm becomes difficult [Met­
calf Report, 1979].
The Subcommittee recommended 
mandatory rotation of auditors at 
periodic intervals. Their suggestion 
fell on deaf ears, and the problem 
still exists today.
Now, several years later, another 
Congressional Subcommittee is exam­
ining the accounting profession. 
Chaired by Representative John Ding­
ell, a Democrat from Michigan, the 
Subcommittee’s primary concern is 
the independence of accountants. 
The Subcommittee’s investigative 
hearings began in early 1985 and 
will not be completed until late 1987 
or perhaps 1988. In his opening 
remarks, Dingell raised an impor­
tant question about auditor indepen­
dence. He stated: “When an indepen­
dent CPA helps set up a company, 
offers it financial and management 
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advice, then performs an audit of its 
books, questions are raised about 
the ability of that accountant to re­
main objective in his dealings” [Wil­
liams, 1985].
This same issue of performing 
nonaudit services was discussed in 
an earlier section of this article deal­
ing with independence in appear­
ance. Dingell’s concern, however, 
runs deeper than an accountant’s 
appearance of independence. Din­
TABLE 1 
A Partial Listing of 
Problem Audits
CPA Firm Involved 
(Year of Audit) Client Co. Audit Problems
Arthur Young & Co. 
(Early 1960’s-1976) 
Frederick McGraw & 
Co. (1977-1983)
Bell & Beckwith Both CPA firms were sued 
because neither followed 
generally accepted auditing 
standards which should 
have revealed the misdeeds 
of the client’s managing 
partner over the years 




Fund of Funds The CPA firm was sued for 
fraud because it failed to 
warn its client, Fund of 
Funds (FF), that it was 
purchasing highly over­
valued investments. FF 
purchased the assets from 
another of AA’s clients. AA 
was sued because they had 
“knowledge of or recklessly 
disregarded” the fraudulent 





The CPA firm failed to 
qualify its opinion even 
though it was evident that 
the client could not raise 
enough capital to survive 
[WSJ Staff, 1981b].




The CPA firm was sued by 
the FDIC for providing the 
bank with a clean opinion 
only a short period of time 
before the bank failed. The 
CPA firm failed to 
recognize that the bank’s 
reserves were inadequate to 
cover bad loans 
[Stricharchuk and Darlin, 
1982].
(continued)
gell and the other members of his 
Subcommittee feel that the account­
ing profession’s ability to remain 
independent in fact may be impaired. 
As Michael Barrett, the Subcommit­
tee’s chief counsel, stated: “We’re 
very concerned that the more hats 
an accounting firm wears for its 
clients, the more the firm is in the 
client’s pocket” [Berton, 1985a].
As mentioned earlier, proving or 
disproving an accountant’s indepen­
dence in fact is almost impossible 
because independence in fact deals 
with an accountant’s mind-set. Since 
mind-reading is out of the question, 
the best way to evaluate the account­
ing profession’s ability to maintain 
independence in fact is to examine 
its recent track record. Table 1 con­
tains a partial listing of questionable 
audits brought to the public’s atten­
tion in the 1980’s.
The listing of questionable audits 
in Table 1 is not all-inclusive, but it is 
sufficient to show that the account­
ing profession is experiencing prob­
lems. Note that the circumstances 
surrounding the questionable audits 
are varied. Some involved personal 
greed; others involved a disregard of 
professional standards. But no mat­
ter what the reason for the problem 
audit — increased competition, au­
ditor complacency or some other 
reason — the end result was a defi­
nite lack of independence. The audi­
tors failed to make the kind of objec­
tive, rational decisions that are ex­
pected of prudent auditors.
Since independence in 
fact deals with intellectual 
honesty, its existence is 
difficult to prove 
or disprove.
Of course, the important concern 
is the pervasiveness of this problem 
within the accounting profession. 
The AICPA feels that cases like those 
shown in Table 1 are only isolated 
occurrences; thus, there is little 
cause for alarm. In regard to the 
number of problem audits that are 
occurring, John W. Zick, chairman 
of the AICPA’s SEC practice sec­
tion, states: “We are aiming for zero 
defects, but we believe the profes­
sion’s record is a good one” [News 
Report, 1985]. Representative Ding­
ell, however, takes quite a different 
stand. He states:
The accounting profession tells 
us with considerable enthusiasm 
that these [problem audits] are only 
a microscopic percentage of the 
total number of audits, and yet one 
of them [ESM Government Securi­
ties] was sufficient to bring about
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TABLE 1 
A Partial Listing of 
Problem Audits 
(continued)
Kenneth Leventhal & 
Co.
(1974-1975)
Emerson’s Ltd. The CPA firm was censured 
by the SEC for conducting 
an audit that was not in 
conformity with generally 
accepted auditing 
standards. The auditors did 
not keep detailed working 
papers, and they “ignored 
warning signals suggesting 
a need to probe further into 
Emerson’s questionable 
accounting practices” [WSJ 
Staff, 1981c].
John P. Butler 
Accountancy Corp. 
(1978)
West Side Mortgage 
Co.
The CPA firm was sued for 
negligence. Among other 
things, the firm failed to 
discover that a $100,000 
note receivable was 
worthless [Berton, 1986b].
Lester Witte & Co. 
(1978)
J. B. Lippincott Co. The SEC censured the CPA 
firm because it did not 
conduct its examination in 
accordance with generally 
accepted auditing 
standards. The CPA firm 
overlooked significant 









The client’s assets and 
profits were materially 
overstated due to improper 
accounting methods. The 
auditors allegedly knew of 
these inaccuracies and 
were therefore grossly 
negligent and reckless in 
performing their duties 
[WSJ Staff, 1985a].
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 
& Co. (1979)
Itel Corp. The CPA firm gave a clean 
opinion even though the 
client’s income was 
overstated due to 
improperly handled 
defaulted leases [Drinkhall, 
1982].
Amundsen & Co. (1979) Olympic Oil & Gas 
Co.
The CPA firm was sued by 
the SEC. Among other 
things, the CPA firm gave 
Olympic a clean audit 
opinion without even 
conducting an examination 
[WSJ Staff, 1983a].
(continued)
the collapse of the entire state-regu­
lated savings and loan industry in 
the State of Ohio and was attended 
by a significant drop in the value of 
the dollar [Williams, 1985].
Based on the number of lawsuits 
filed against accountants, the public 
also believes the problem to be seri­
ous. Most of the lawsuits are settled 
out of court, with the accounting 
firms paying large settlements. For 
example, Arthur Andersen & Co., 
the nation’s largest CPA firm, has 
had settlements of almost $140 mil­
lion since 1980 [Berton, 1985b].
One final point should be made 
regarding the extent of the inde­
pendence problem. A problem audit 
is usually detected only after the  
audit client files for bankruptcy. As 
long as the client company remains 
solvent, the accountant’s work is 
rarely scrutinized by persons out­
side the profession. This raises a big 
question. If this many problem au­
dits have been detected, how many 
more have gone undetected? Is it 
possible that only the tip of the ice­
berg has been exposed?
B Based on the number of
lawsuits filed against 
accountants, the public 
also believes the problem
to be serious.
Summary and Conclusion
An auditor’s opinion has meaning 
because the public places confi­
dence in the auditor’s ability to make 
decisions objectively. There is no 
doubt that the accounting profes­
sion, as a whole, is comprised of 
men and women of high integrity. At 
the same time, however, accountants 
arehuman. Becausethey are human, 
their audit decisions cannot be made 
in a vacuum. Their decisions always 
have and always will be affected by a 
certain amount of pressure (e.g., 
time-budget pressure and client pres­
sure). When this pressure becomes 
too great, however, the accountant’s 
independence can become im­
paired. The number of questionable 
audits that have been disclosed in 
recent years indicates that perhaps 
this pressure point has been reached 
quite often. Ω
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TABLE 1 
A Partial Listing of 
Problem Audits 
(continued)




The bank collapsed just 
three weeks after receiving 
a clean opinion from the 
CPA firm. Even though 
FDIC examiners were at the 
bank the same time as E & 
W, the accountants did not 
talk to the examiners to find 
out the status of the FDIC 
investigation [Stricharchuk 
and Darlin, 1982].




The CPA firm did not 
qualify its opinion even 
though the client’s income 
was inflated due to 
inadequate reserves for 
losses on workers’ 
compensation cases [WSJ 
Staff, 1983b].
Ernst & Whinney 
(1980)
Dayco Corp. The CPA firm failed to 
detect $120 million in 
phony orders for rubber 
hoses and belts and $14 
million in advance 
commissions paid a sales 
agent who allegedly placed 




AM International The SEC sued the CPA firm 
because the auditors knew 
of, or “but for a conscious 
or reckless disregard for the 
facts” would have known of, 
many instances where the 
financial statements were 
not in accordance with 
GAAP [WSJ Staff, 1985b].




A CPA firm partner 
accepted personal 
payments totaling $125,000 
from officers of the client 
company. In return, even 
though the client was 
insolvent, clean audit 
opinions were given on the 
client's financial statements 
from 1980-1983 [Brannigan, 
1985].
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 
& Co. (1981)
Penn Square Bank Along with officers of the 
bank, the CPA firm was 
sued for fraud for 
concealing the 
nonperformance of certain 
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TABLE 1 
A Partial Listing of 
Problem Audits 
(continued)
Fox & Co. (1981) Alpex Computer 
Corp.
The CPA firm was censured 
by the SEC for performing a 
reckless audit. The firm did 
not adhere to professional 
standards. This resulted in 
its failure to discover 
material fraudulent 
transactions, including 
worthless notes and 
overvalued real estate 
property [Wendell, 1985].
Coopers & Lybrand 
(1981-1982)
Digilog Inc. The SEC charged that the 
CPA firm had engaged in 
“improper professional 
conduct” when it issued a 
clean opinion on the client’s 
financial statements.
Digilog failed to consolidate 
its financial statements with 
that of DBS International, a 
company controlled by 
Digilog. This resulted in a 
$1.2 million overstatement 
of Digilog's 1982 pre-tax 
earnings [Ingersoll, 1984].
Seidman & Seidman 
(1983)
Chronar Corp. The CPA firm was censured 
by the SEC for failing to 
gather sufficient evidence 
to warrant the clean opinion 
given. The CPA firm did not 
challenge two questionable 
transactions that overstated 
revenue by $2.7 million 
[Ingersoll, 1985].
Numerous CPA firms 
(1984)
Government grants A GAO study asserted that 
1/3 of the audits performed 
on government grants by 
accounting firms in 1984 
were sloppy and may 
warrant discipline by the 
state regulators. 
Furthermore, many 
accountants conceded that 
their audits of U.S. grants 
were inadequate [Berton, 
1986a].
Touche Ross & Co. 
(1984)
Beverly Hills Savings 
& Loan
The CPA firm helped its 
failing client restructure 
some of its ailing 
investment projects into 
equity-participation loans. 
This allowed the client to 
accrue interest on these 
loans and was a highly 
questionable accounting 
practice [Pound, 1985].
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